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1.	Introduction		
	
Conventional	wisdom	in	industrial	economics	has	it	that	collusion	is	easier	the	
fewer	the	firms.	This	tenet	is	intuitive	enough:	fewer	firms	will	find	it	easier	to	
coordinate	on	a	collusive	outcome	or	on	some	punishment	mechanism.	The	
conventional	wisdom	can	also	be	rigorously	derived	in	a	repeated	game	where	
cooperation	is	an	equilibrium	of	the	supergame,	but,	the	more	firms	there	are	in	
the	market,	the	more	patient	they	must	be	to	sustain	a	collusive	equilibrium.1	
	
Despite	its	popularity	on	“lists	of	factors	facilitating	collusion,”	it	turns	out	the	
conventional	wisdom	is	not	useful	for	cartel	detection.	Empirical	studies	about	
factors	that	predict	the	frequency	of	detected	cartels	do	not	report	favorable	
results.	Among	others,	Levenstein	and	Suslow	(2006)	cannot	establish	a	simple	
correlation	between	cartel	frequency	and	concentration	or	the	number	of	firms.		
	
Why	are	there	not	more	cartels	the	fewer	the	firms	in	the	industry?	The	decision	
to	establish	a	cartel	should	foremost	depend	on	the	gains	and	costs	from	
cartelization.	The	costs	include	fines	if	caught	by	an	authority	and,	importantly,	
the	opportunity	cost	in	terms	of	the	foregone	profits	when	firms	do	not	talk.	If	
collusion	is	easier	with	fewer	firms,	this	will	also	be	true	under	(legal)	tacit	
collusion	(Ivaldi	et	al.	2003),	suggesting	relatively	high	profits	already	without	
explicit	cartel	talk.	However,	if	firms	do	well	without	talking,	why	should	they	
risk	fines	and	prison	sentences	for	a	little	extra	profit	from	price	fixing?2			
	
This	paper	illustrates	in	a	simple	laboratory	experiment	how	the	incentives	to	
form	cartels	depend	on	the	number	of	firms.		We	study	industries	with	two	and	
four	firms.	The	firms	can	choose	to	set	up	a	cartel,	but	a	cartel	authority	
randomly	audits	markets	and	imposes	fines	on	cartels.	In	previous	research	
(Fonseca	and	Normann	2012),	we	exogenously	imposed	whether	or	not	firms	
could	talk.	There	was	neither	a	choice	to	communicate	nor	a	cartel	authority	that	
																																																								
1	See	Kühn	(2012)	for	a	model	where,	exceptionally,	market	fragmentation	facilitates	collusion.	
2	Levenstein	and	Suslow	(2006)	mention	this	and	other	possible	reasons	why	there	are	not	more	
cartels	with	fewer	firms.		Davis	and	De	(2013)	find	many	larger	number	and	asymmetric	
industries	in	their	dataset	of	EU	cartels	and	argue	that	ringleaders	stabilize	these	cartels.			
3	
	
would	penalize	such	behavior.	Comparing	profits	with	and	without	the	
opportunity	to	talk,	we	found	that	medium‐sized	firms	gain	the	most	from	
communication.	We	extend	this	research	by	endogenizing	cartel	formation.			
	
Our	data	indicate	that	the	duopolies	form	fewer	cartels	than	the	four‐firm	
oligopolies,	in	an	apparent	violation	of	the	conventional	wisdom.	This	is	because	
of	a	hysteresis	effect:	after	talking	once,	industries	maintain	prices	that	are	
higher	than	before	the	first	cartel	was	set	up.	This	hysteresis	effect	is	more	
pronounced	for	duopolies.	Therefore,	two‐firm	markets	are	under	less	pressure	
to	set	up	a	cartel	anew.	
	
2.	Experimental	Design	and	Procedures	
	
Our	computerized	experiment	implemented	Bertrand	oligopolies	with	inelastic	
demand	and	zero	marginal	costs	of	production	(Dufwenberg	and	Gneezy	2000).	
There	were	m=300	simulated	consumers	whose	reservation	price	for	a	
homogeneous	good	was	100.	Subjects	simultaneously	selected	a	price	p	between	
0	and	100,	and	whoever	set	the	lowest	price	captured	the	entire	market	and	
earned	profits	of	300p;	if	more	than	one	subject	set	the	lowest	price,	profits	were	
split	equally	among	those	subjects;	all	other	subjects	made	zero	profits.	Our	
treatment	variable	was	the	number	of	firms:	N=2	or	N=4.	
	
There	was	a	minimum	of	25	periods	in	our	experiment.	After	the	25th	period,	the	
computer	stopped	the	experiment	with	a	one‐in‐six	chance	(which	was	common	
knowledge,	as	per	the	instructions).		Subjects	remained	fixed	in	groups	of	two	or	
four,	for	the	whole	experiment.		
	
Firms	could	choose	to	initiate	a	chat	box	that	got	activated	only	if	all	firms	chose	
to	do	so.	If	so,	all	firms	in	the	market	could	communicate	for	30	seconds	before	
the	price‐setting	stage	and	the	chat	box	continued	to	be	available	in	the	following	
periods	until	the	cartel	was	detected	or	until	the	end	of	the	supergame.		
	
Following	several	leniency	experiments	(Apesteguia	et	al.		2007,	Hinloopen	and	
Soetevent	2008,	Bigoni	et	al.	2009),	the	computer	audited	each	market	every	
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period	with	probability	0.15.	If	a	market	was	audited	and	firms	were	caught	
communicating	in	period	t,	100pt/N	is	the	per‐firm,	per‐period	fine.	Firms	were	
fined	for	the	past	periods	in	which	they	were	talking,	up	to	a	maximum	of	five	
periods.	Formally,	the	total	fine	per	firm	is	ܨ௧ ൌ ଵ଴଴ே ∑ ݌ఛ௧ఛୀఏ ,	where	݌ఛ	is	the	price	
in	period	߬,	ߠ ൌ max	ሼݐ െ 5, ݐ଴ሽ,	and	t0	is	the	cartel’s	initial	communication	
period.	Since	the	fine	for	the	entire	industry	was	evenly	distributed	among	firms,	
for	any	cartel	price	the	(expected)	fine	was	the	same	for	N=2	and	N=4.			
	
We	have	16	independent	markets	for	each	treatment.	The	experiments	were	
conducted	in	July	2012	and	July	2013	at	the	DICE‐Lab	of	the	University	of	
Duesseldorf.	Participants	were	students	from	all	over	campus.	Sessions	lasted	
less	than	an	hour.	The	experimental	currency	was	the	“Taler,”	whose	exchange	
rate	to	euro	was	1:15,000	and	1:30,000	in	the	four‐firm	markets	and	the	
duopolies,	respectively.	The	average	payment	of	the	96	participants	was	€13.34.	
	
	
3.	Results		
	
We	first	analyze	cartel	formation.	The	N=4	markets	successfully	formed	nearly	
twice	as	many	cartels:	we	find	2.19	(std.	dev.	=	1.22)	cartels	for	the	N=4	
industries	on	average	versus	1.13	(0.62)	for	N=2,	a	highly	significant	difference	
(Mann‐Whitney	(MW)	test,	p=0.003,	two	tailed).	The	result	is	surprising	since	
getting	a	consensus	to	chat	is	harder	with	bigger	groups.	When	we	count	each	
instance	in	which	at	least	one	firm	chooses	to	initiate	the	chat	(possibly	
unsuccessfully	so),	the	N=4	markets	exhibit	significantly	more	attempts	to	form	a	
cartel	(8.25)	than	the	duopolies	(2.94)	(MW	test,	p	=	0.001).	Thus,	despite	a	
lower	proportion	of	successful	attempts,	more	cartels	are	established	with	N=4.	
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Figure	1.	The	distribution	of	the	number	of	cartels	formed	per	market.		
	
Figure	1	shows	the	distribution	of	the	number	of	cartels	per	market	by	
treatment.	The	vast	majority	of	duopolies	talked	exactly	once	(there	was	even	
one	N=2	market	where	players	never	talked	and	nevertheless	performed	well),	
one	duopoly	started	two	cartels	and	another	one	three.	By	contrast,	10	of	the	16	
N=4	markets	started	more	than	one	cartel.		
	
	 Average	selling	price	
	 all	periods when	talking when	not	talking	
N=2	 83.95
(19.36)
88.65
(15.03)
80.80	
(21.09)	
N=4	 78.63
(14.82)
91.10
(12.37)
68.59	
(25.61)	
Table	1:	Average	selling	prices	by	treatment,	standard	deviations	in	parentheses,	
calculated	from	group	moments.			
	
Looking	for	an	explanation	for	this	result,	we	look	at	selling	prices	(that	is,	the	
lowest	of	two	or	four	prices,	respectively)	in	Table	1.	Duopolies	have	higher	
average	prices,	but	the	gap	is	particularly	pronounced	when	the	firms	do	not	
0%
20%
40%
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80%
100%
N=2 N=4
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talk.	Under	communication,	the	duopolies	even	do	slightly	worse	than	the	N=4	
markets.4		
	
Since	selling	prices	are	equivalent	to	profits	in	our	experiment,	the	gain	from	
talking	can	be	measured	by	taking	the	difference	of	the	selling	prices	with	and	
without	communication.5	We	calculate	this	difference	for	each	market	(except	
for	the	one	duopoly	that	never	talked)	and	obtain	that	it	is	significantly	larger	for	
N=4	(Wilcoxon	signed‐ranked	test,	p=0.016).	In	short,	duopolies	have	a	smaller	
incentive	to	form	a	cartel.		
	
Selling	prices	without	communication	are	affected	by	hysteresis	effects.6	In	both	
treatments,	prices	after	cartel	disruption	do	not	decline	to	the	levels	prior	to	the	
first	cartel	being	founded.	For	those	industries	that	did	not	immediately	found	a	
cartel,	the	average	selling	prices	in	period	one	were	34.33	(N=2)	and	32.21	
(N=4)	and	are	therefore	substantially	lower	than	the	prices	in	the	right	column	
of	Table	1.	Also,	the	price	in	the	period	preceding	the	first	cartel	formation	was	
31.50	and	18.43	for	N=2	and	N=4	respectively,	while	the	price	in	the	period	
immediately	after	the	first	cartel’s	detection	was	83.75	and	77.64	(N=2:	p=0.068;	
N=4:	p=0.001,	Wilcoxon	signed‐rank	test).	The	vast	majority	of	markets	formed	
their	first	cartel	in	the	first	three	periods	of	the	experiment;	therefore	most	
pricing	decisions	without	communication	occurred	after	a	cartel	was	detected.	
When	we	distinguish	the	two	cases,	we	obtain	practically	the	same	result,	so	we	
report	the	mixed	measure	here	for	simplicity.	We	reiterate,	however,	that	the	
high	level	of	prices	“when	not	talking”	is	due	to	a	hysteresis	effect.		
	
The	hysteresis	effect	can	also	be	demonstrated	when	considering	selling	prices	
and	whether	a	cartel	existed	before	as	explanatory	variables	for	cartel	
foundation.	We	estimate	a	random‐effects	Probit	regression	using	as	the	
regressor	a	dummy	variable	taking	a	value	of	one	if	market	j	formed	a	cartel	in	
																																																								
4	There	are	no	significant	time	trends	of	the	selling	prices,	with	or	without	communication.		
5	We	do	not	subtract	actual	fines	here	(which	would	yield	the	cartels’	ex‐post	profitability)	
because	actual	fines	vary	due	to	randomness	of	the	detection	mechanism.	
6	See	Harrington	(2004)	for	a	model	rationalizing	hysteresis	effects.		
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period	t,	conditional	on	a	cartel	not	being	active	in	period	t‐1.	The	equation	we	
estimate	is:	
	
Chatj,t=	I{β0	+	β1	Quad	+	β2	Sellpj,t‐1	+	β3	Sellpj,t‐1	x	Quad	+	β4	CartelB4	+	β5	
CartelB4	x	Quad	+	uj	+	vjt	>0}		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1)	
	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
Quad	 0.348**	 (0.142)	 0.006	 (0.352)	 0.550***	 (0.468)	
Sellpj,t‐1	 	 	 ‐0.008*	 (0.005)	
Sellpj,t‐1	x	Quad	 	 	 ‐0.007	 (0.006)	
CartelB4	 	 ‐2.125***	 (0.392) ‐1.543***	 (0.491)	
CartelB4	x	Quad	 	 0.873**	 (0.437)	 0.638	 (0.554)	
Constant	 ‐1.630***	 (0.109)	 ‐0.407	 (0.268)	 ‐0.306	 (0.391)	
Groups,	N	 32,	720	 32,	720	 32,	688	
Rho	 0.000	 0.222†	 0.539†	
Log	likelihood	 ‐188.747	 ‐153.608	 ‐120.622	
†:	significant	at	the	1%	level	using	LR	test.		
***,	**,	*:	significant	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	level.	
	
Table	2:	Probit	estimates	of	the	likelihood	of	starting	a	cartel.	
	
	
The	regression	results	are	as	follows.	Specification	(1)	is	a	restricted	version	of	
our	econometric	model	in	order	to	avoid	dropping	the	first	period	from	the	data	
(nine	duopolies	and	two	four‐firm	markets	began	cartels	in	period	1).	Consistent	
with	the	above	results,	we	find	that	N=4	markets	are	more	inclined	to	form	
cartels.	In	specification	(2),	we	consider	the	effect	of	having	had	a	cartel	in	
existence	before	the	decision	to	start	a	new	cartel	(CartelB4).	The	history	of	
collusion	in	a	market	matters	differently	for	different	market	structures:	
duopolists	are	significantly	less	likely	than	their	four‐firm	market	counterparts	
to	start	a	cartel	if	they	had	colluded	explicitly	before.	Interestingly,	the	coefficient	
on	Quad	is	now	non‐significant.	In		specification	(3),	we	also	consider	the	effect	
of	the	selling	price	in	the	previous	period	(Sellpj,t‐1).	The	effect	of	past	prices	is	
negative.		The	higher	prices	were	in	the	previous	period,	the	lower	the	odds	of	
forming	a	cartel.	Four‐firm	markets	are	more	likely	to	engage	in	cartels	than	
duopolies	and	CartelB4	continues	to	be	highly	significant.		
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4.	Discussion		
	
We	find	more	endogenously	founded	cartels	in	experimental	Bertrand	markets	
with	four	firms	than	with	two.	Markets	with	four	firms	have	a	bigger	incentive	to	
cartelize,	as	a	comparison	of	selling	prices	suggests.	Whereas	enabling	cartel‐like	
communication	leads	to	significant	increases	in	prices,	breaking	a	cartel	does	not	
lead	to	the	opposite	result	–	hysteresis.	This	is	particularly	pronounced	for	
duopolies,	which	consequently	are	less	likely	to	re‐start	a	cartel	after	being	
caught	by	the	cartel	authority.		
	
Our	result	is	at	odds	with	the	conventional	wisdom,	if	interpreted	as	“there	are	
more	cartels	the	fewer	the	firms.”		In	our	data,	duopolies	have	higher	prices	
throughout,	so	the	conventional	wisdom	that	“fewer	firms	find	it	easier	to	
maintain	high	prices”	does	hold	both	when	firms	talk	and	when	they	do	not	talk.	
But	we	also	saw	that	the	gain	from	talking	is	larger	for	the	less	concentrated	
industry,	and,	as	a	result,	“there	are	fewer	cartels	the	fewer	the	firms.”		
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Instructions 
 
Hello, and welcome to our experiment. Please read these instructions very carefully. The 
experiment will be conducted anonymously, meaning that you will not know with which 
persons you are interacting. We will not save any data in connection with your name. 
 
Through your decisions and the decisions of the other participants, you may stand to earn 
Taler. At the end of the experiment, we will immediately exchange your Taler at a rate of 
 
30,000 Taler = 1 Euro 
 
which you will receive cash in hand. We ask you to remain in your booth until we call you to 
collect your payment. When you collect your payment, please have to hand all the documents 
you have received from us. 
 
We kindly request that you remain silent during the entire experiment; if at any point you 
require assistance, please raise your hand and we will come to you. 
 
 
Firms and markets 
 
In this experiment you will be in the role of a firm which is in a market with another firm. 
During the entire experiment, it will always be the same firms (or participants) serving a 
market. That is, you will always be together with the same firm in the market.  
 
The firms produce a good and there are no costs of producing this good.  
 
This market is made up of 300 identical consumers, each of whom wants to purchase one unit 
of the good at the lowest price. The consumers will pay as much as 100 Taler for a unit of the 
good.  
 
The firms’ profits depend on the prices set by the two firms. In particular, the firm who sets 
the lowest price will sell to all 300 buyers. The other firm will not have any customers left to 
supply and will therefore make zero profit. If both firms set the lowest price, they will then 
equally divide the available consumers.  
 
 
Let us go over a couple of illustrative examples: 
 
1. Firm A sets a price of 85 and firm B chooses a price of 75. Firm B has set the lowest 
price and therefore sells its 300 units first at a price of 75, making a profit of 22,500 
Taler. Firm A will therefore not supply any customers, thus making 0 Taler. 
 
2. Firm A and firm B both set a price of 70. Given that firms A and B have set the same 
price, they will have to share the available customers equally. Hence, both firms will sell 
150 units at a price of 70 each per unit, therefore making a profit of 10,500 Taler.  
 
 
Communication 
 
At the beginning of the first period, all firms will be asked whether they wish to communicate 
with each other before setting the price.  
 
  
If both firms agree to communicate, a text box will appear on the screen for 30 seconds before 
firms can set their prices. Firms can communicate about anything they wish, so long as they 
do not identify who they are in the room. (Abusive language will not be tolerated.)   
 
 
Payment for communication 
 
If firms decide to communicate, they will have to make a payment with a 15% probability. A 
random computer draw will decide whether a payment has to be made. If not all firms decide 
to communicate with each other, no payment will have to be made.  
 
The payment is determined by the lowest price charged up to five periods back. If the 
communication started less than five periods back, then only the periods where you 
communicated will be charged. To summarize: 
 
Payment = 50 x the sum of the lowest prices since the start of communication, but not 
more than for the last 5 rounds, with a 15% probability. 
 
Consider again our examples. If in Example 1 firms decided to communicate before setting 
the prices and if the payment has to be made according to the random draw, the payment will 
be equal to 50·75 = 3,750 for each firm. Firm A would make a loss of -3,750 and firm B’s 
payoff would be 22,500 – 3,750 = 18,750 Taler. If the communication was enabled for more 
periods, the payment would accordingly be larger.  
 
In Example 2, both firms had a price of 70. If the firms decided in favor of communication, 
the payment to be made after the random draw is 70 · 50 = 3,500 for both companies. Both 
would earn 10,500 – 3,500 = 7,000 Taler. If communication has been enabled at this price for 
three periods already, the payment is 3 · 3,500 = 10,500 Taler. Note once again that it is not 
necessary to make a payment in every period. It occurs with a 15% probability. 
 
Once firms agree to communicate, they will not need to agree again to communicate. 
Communication will stay enabled up to the point where you have to make a payment. Firms 
will then have the possibility again to agree on whether they wish to communicate. 
 
 
Feedback  
 
At the end of each period, you will find out the prices of all the firms. You will also learn how 
much profit you have made. 
 
 
Duration 
 
There will be at least 25 periods in this experiment.  
 
After that, the computer will throw a virtual die which will determine the end of the 
experiment. If a 6 is thrown, the experiment will end; otherwise, another period will take 
place. 
 
You will be matched with the same participant in every period. 
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